Presumption of innocence and the doctrine of proof beyond reasonable doubt in judicial review

Abstract

Because the presumption of innocence is a fundamental principle for democratic-constitutional systems, several constitutional courts have sought, in the most diverse ways and using various methodologies, to develop parameters to ensure that criminal convictions are grounded on a certain level of evidentiary certainty. To perform the protective function of the principle of presumption of innocence, some constitutional courts have developed the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof. Constitutional courts in different countries have taken significant steps in overcoming the merely rhetorical use of “beyond a reasonable doubt”, assigning a more dense and operative normative meaning to this standard. Some constitutional courts – e.g. Constitutional Court of Spain and Constitutional Court of Colombia – seek to protect the presumption of innocence by demanding not only the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but also requiring full assessment of the evidence and logical and rational motivation regarding the evidence.